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The Rights of Sources -The Critical Element
in the Clash over Reporter's Privilege
New York Times reporter Myron Farber's five-month legal battle'
to protect his confidential sources focused public attention on a delicate
legal question: how should a court accommodate the interest of a re-
porter 2 in upholding his pledge of confidentiality and the countervail-ing interest of the government or a private party- in compelling dis-
1. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
2. Conflicts over nondisclosure of sources or materials most frequently involve re-
porters, but may also involve editors, photographers, announcers, or others engaged in
media operations. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 377 F. Supp. 297 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 501 F.2d 418
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913, contempt upheld, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975)
(radio station manager ordered to produce tapes); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (picture editor and photographer ordered to appear and
produce photographs); cf. S.36, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973), reprinted in Hearings on
Newsmen's Privilege Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 409-10 (1973) (proposed national shield law would
protect any reporter, editor, commentator, journalist, writer, correspondent, announcer, or
other person directly engaged in gathering or presenting news) [hearings hereinafter cited
as 1973 Hearings]. In this Note the word "reporter" is used to refer to all news-media
personnel.
3. The demand for testimony may be made by a litigant in a civil suit; by the
government, in a criminal case or on behalf of an agency or legislative body; or by a
criminal defendant. In each case, the government-through the judiciary-is the party
that challenges a reporter's resistance to a subpoena. In civil cases in which litigants at-
tempt to compel testimony, the subpoena is issued by authority of the court, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 45, and a recipient who fails to obey may be deemed in contempt of the issuing
court, e.g., id. § (f). When the reporter's testimony is sought by the prosecutor in a
criminal case, or for a legislative or administrative body, the government confronts
directly the reporter resisting disclosure.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to compulsory process for the attend-
ance of witnesses, U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI, but a witness may assert any valid legal exemp-
tion for withholding his actual testimony, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444
(1972) (power to compel testimony not absolute; numerous exemptions exist). In such a
case, the witness may be charged with contempt, and it is the government that challenges
the witness's refusal to testify. Thus in the case of Myron Farber, In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259,
394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978), although the testimony was sought by
criminal defendant Dr. Mario Jascalevich, it was the government that ordered Farber
to testify and the government that prosecuted Farber when lie refused to comply.
Criminal defendants, despite their constitutional right to compulsory process, may be less
successful in actually compelling testimony than prosecutors. See Murasky, The Journal-
ist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829, 898 (1974) (courts have




closure? The Supreme Court has confronted the issue of reporter's
privilege only once, in Branzburg v. Hayes.4 In Branzburg the Court
denied the reporters'r claims that the Constitution excused them from
testifying before a grand jury, and declared that the interest of the
grand jury in considering all information relating to possible wrong-
doing prevailed over the interests of the reporters.0 The Court in
Branzburg disregarded, however, the interests of a third party-con-
fidential sources.
Although the interests of sources have been noted by commentators7
and were even argued to the Court in Branzburg,8 these interests have
been considered analogous to those of the reporter. A source's interests,
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In three previous cases the Court denied certiorari: Garland v.
Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Murphy v. Colorado, No.'
19604 (Colo. Sup, Ct.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244,
436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
5. Four cases involving three reporters, each subpoenaed before grand juries, were
consolidated for hearing in Branzburg. See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970) (reporter knowledgeable about Black Panthers); Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970) (reporter witnessed drug use); Branzburg v. Meigs, No. V-29-71
(Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1971) (same); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971)
(reporter present at Black Panther session).
6. 408 U.S. at 690-91. Branzburg has been discussed extensively by commentators. For
analysis of the case generally, see Murasky, supra note 3; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
86 HARv. L. REv. 50, 137-48 (1972).
7. V. BLAsi, PRESS SUBPOENAS: AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 138-43 (1972); Murasky,
supra note 3, at 847-49; Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations,
Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198, 1228-35 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Newsman's Privilege]; Comment, Constitutional Protection for the News-
mal's Work Product, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 127-29 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Protection]; 84 HARV. L. REV. 1536, 1538-39 (1971). See also Neier, The
Rights of Farber's Sources, NATION, Sept. 16, 1978, at 228 (popular discussion of Farber).
8. E.g., Brief for Petitioner Branzburg at 26, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
United Church of Christ Amicus Brief for Respondent Caldwell, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972), reprinted in Hearing on Freedom of the Press Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
1243 (1971-1972).
9. See, e.g., Murasky, supra note 3, at 843-51 (First Amendment interests of public,
source, and press); Newsman's Privilege, sunra note 7, at 1223-35 (newsman asserts interest
in newsgathering and in protecting source).
Commentators who have singled out the source's interest, see note 7 supra, apparently
argue that if the interests of the source and the interests of the press are cumulated the
resulting interest in nondisclosure will be worthy of greater consideration. One com-
mentator, however, does not make even this timid assertion. See Murasky, sut ra note 3,
at 849 (fortunately, argument for permitting reporters to protect sources does not rest on
recognizing source's First Amendment rights). V. BtAsi, supra note 7, provides by far the
most detailed analysis of the First Amendment interests of the source, yet he too simply
combines the source's interest with those of the press and of the public, id. at 106-46.
The only commentator to recognize the distinctive nature of the source's interest appears
to be the author of a pre-Branzburg casenote. See 84 HARV. L. REV. 1536, 1538-39 (1971)
(source's interest distinguished from public's interest). The difficulty with each of these
analyses, however, is that although the cumulative effect of the reporter's interest and the
source's interest may be greater than either alone, it is not clear to what extent the com-
bined interest is significantly different from the reporter's interest that the Court refused
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however, are qualitatively different and far more compelling than those
of a reporter. When a source's interests are properly recognized, the
Branzburg mode of analysis-a mode employed regularly by the Court
in recent First Amendment cases-becomes inappropriate. This Note
will demonstrate that proper consideration of the interests of sources
compels courts to use a different analytic approach and grant sources
greater protection than was provided in Branzbiurg or In re Farber.'0
I. Branzburg's Analysis of the Competing Interests
Justice White, writing for the Court in Branzburg, weighed two
conflicting interests-the grand jury interest in receiving testimony"
and the press interest in protecting its confidential sources.' 2 The
grand jury interest, the Court determined, should prevail.ia
The right of the government or a private party to compel witnesses
to appear and testify is well established14 because the adversary system
requires that each party to a dispute be able to present all the facts that
support its position.1a When reporters refuse to reveal their sources, it
was suggested in Branzburg, the government may be denied important
information.16
to protect in Branzburg. Because the source's interest is qualitatively different from that
of the reporter, however, and deserving of a higher degree of protection, this Note argues
the source's interest and the reporter's interest together will be deserving of far greater
protection than the reporter's interest alone.
10. In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259, 894 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
11. 408 U.S. at 686.88.
12. Id. at 679-82.
13. Id. at 690-91.
14. In England, the Statute of Elizabeth in 1562-63 imposed a penalty on any person
who failed to appear after a proper summons. 5 Eliz. 1, c.9, § 12 (any person failing to
appear shall forfeit £ 10 and pay further recompense for any harm). Early cases upholding
the government's right to compel testimony include Countess of Shrewsbury's Trial, 2
How. St. Tr. 769, 80 Eng. Rep. 381 (1612) (all subjects owe King their knowledge); Dobson
v. Crew, Cro. Eliz. 705, 78 Eng. Rep. 940 (1599) (person is compelled by law to testify).
The right of government to compel testimony was recognized-and resisted-in colonial
America. Benjamin Franklin recounts in his autobiography an occasion when, as a youth,
he was called before the local officials to disclose the author of an anonymous article in
the newspaper to which he was apprenticed; Franklin writes that he refused to reveal
the author's identity. B. FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 33-34 (L.
Lemisch ed. 1961).
In the United States, the First Judiciary Act established a statutory basis for the
government's right to compel testimony. Ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88-90 (1789) (any person
may be compelled to appear and testify). The first reported American case over a re-
porter's refusal to disclose his sources appears to be Ex Parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471
(C.C.D.C. 1848), involving New York Herald reporter John Nugent. For a history of the
right of government to compel testimony, see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-81
(1919); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2190-92 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
15. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) ("The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive.")
16. 408 U.S. at 701-02 (grand jury investigation not completed until every clue
examined; no reason to excuse reporter who may help grand jury).
The duty to testify has never been absolute, and some privileges such as those between
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The reporters, however, asserted that First Amendment protection
of the press includes the right to gather news and that as part of that
right the press can refuse to disclose its sources.' 7 Some sources will not
provide information unless guaranteed anonymity,' 8 and the reporters
contended that the press's interest in protecting sources outweighed
the need for disclosure.' 9 Branzburg, despite its holding against the
reporters, strengthened journalists' claims for a constitutional privilege
by explicitly stating for the first time that newsgathering is protected
by the First Amendment.20 Newsgathering "qualifies" for protection,
attorneys and clients and between spouses have been readily recognized. 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 14, § 2197. The Fifth Amendment provides a privilege to all individuals against
self-incrimination in criminal cases. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. However, the Supreme Court
has endorsed the general rule that all persons must testify and that all exemptions are
exceptional. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
17. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-81 (1972); accord, State v. Buchanan, 250
Or. 244, 247, 436 P.2d 729, 730, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
The constitutional claim was first asserted in Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The claim was rejected in Garland, however, because the
information concealed by the reporter was essential to adjudicate the plaintiff's action
for libel. Id. at 549-50.
18. The district court in Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd
sub nora. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), one of the cases consolidated in Branzburg, found that "confidential relationships
. . . are commonly developed and maintained by professional journalists, and are in-
dispensable to their work of gathering, analyzing and publishing the news," id. at 361
(emphasis added). During lengthy testimony before a congressional subcommittee con-
sidering legislation on reporter's privilege, repeated statements were offered on the im-
portance of confidential sources. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 76 (statement
of Jack Landau and Fred Graham) (affidavits from more than 100 reporters allege that
attempts to force disclosure of confidential sources have inhibited press freedom); id. at
553 (statement of Citizen's Right to News Committee) (much newsgathering depends on
sources who will not, for various reasons, provide information if their identities are re-
vealed). Justice Stewart, dissenting in Branzburg, cited numerous statements supporting
his view that disclosure could inhibit sources. See 408 U.S. at 730 n.8, 732 n.14, 736 n.20
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the importance of confidentiality for sources is
the fact that reporters have sometimes cancelled stories because of fears that they could
not protect a source's identity. Five specific examples of such cancellations are presented
in 1973 Hearings, supra note 2, at 755; any such cancellation severely restricts the flow
of information to the public that the First Amendment is designed to protect. See As-
sociated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (First Amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public").
19. 408 U.S. at 681. Reporters generally do not argue for an absolute privilege. In
Branzburg, for instance, each of the reporters argued for a qualified privilege, id. at 680,
702, although the tests suggested differed slightly, see Brief for Petitioner Branzburg,
sup~ra note 8, at 44 (testimony privileged unless necessary to prevent direct, immediate
threat of irreparable damage to national security, human life or liberty); Brief for
Respondent Caldwell at 82-84, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (testimony priv-
ileged absent showing of compelling state interest); Brief for Petitioner Pappas at 46,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (testimony privileged absent showing of reason-
able belief that crime committed, newsman has relevant information, and state was un-
successful in obtaining information elsewhere).
20. 408 U.S. at 681 ("Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
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the Court said, because without some protection "freedom of the press
could be eviscerated." 21
In weighing the competing interests, the Court in Branzburg em-
ployed a mode of analysis that it has used subsequently in several First
Amendment cases.22 First, the Court determined that the burden im-
posed on the press by grand jury subpoenas was only an indirect
restraint-not a direct restraint-because the press claim for protection
was based on its instrumental interest in newsgathering and not on any
restriction of pure expression.2 3 This instrumental interest, derived
from the need to facilitate pure expression, merited less protection than
expression itself. The cases before it, the Court said, "involve no in-
trusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on
what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that
the press publish what it prefers to withhold. ' 24 Second, the Court
minimized even this indirect restraint by determining that the in-
hibiting effect of grand jury subpoenas on the press was "uncertain"' -
and "speculative. '20 This conclusion was crucial because an indirect
restraint on First Amendment activity encounters constitutional ob-
jections only when its chilling effect is certain or substantial.2 7
of the press could be eviscerated."); see id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (right to gather
news, of some dimensions, must exist). The right to gather news is derived from the other
interests of the press in informing the public, and from the public's interest in being in-
formed. See generally Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L.
REv. 838 (1971).
21. 408 U.S. at 681.
22. See note 27 infra.
23. 408 U.S. at 691 (case involves "no restraint on what newspapers may publish or
on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to acquire").
24. Id. at 681.
25. Id. at 690.
26. Id. at 694.
27. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) ("Allegations of a subjective
.chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a
threat of specific future harm .... "); cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566-67
(1978) ("whatever incremental effect there may be" on press activity by police search of
newspaper office too slight to invalidate issuance of warrant); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (when chilling effect "at best a prediction," statute cannot be in-
validated as overbroad).
The Court's analysis in Branzburg-(I) a strong state interest, (2) given effect through
a rule of general applicability, (3) sufficing to overcome an assertion of First Amendment
protection not based on pure expression-has been used since in other press cases. See,
e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67 (1978) (use of third-party searches in
furtherance of state interest in uncovering evidence of crime not unconstitutional when
applied to newspaper office because burden caused by such searches is not great); Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (policy prohibiting certain face-to-face in-
terviews by reporters with prison inmates, in furtherance of prison discipline, constitu-
tionally permissible); cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1973) (overbreadth
must be substantial when law of general application at stake); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 390 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (libel law not sufficient threat to press to
warrant limiting ability of private citizen to establish press liability).
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By characterizing the burden on the press in this way-as indirect and
only "speculative"-the Court could engage in a balancing of interests,
because "the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press."2 8 Thus the sole question, according to Justice
White, was whether an otherwise valid rule of general application-
that citizens must respond to grand jury subpoenas-could be applied
to reporters.29 Weighing the press's "speculative" interest in nondis-
closure against the grand jury's need for testimony, the Court held that
the interest of the grand jury was paramount.30
Although the right of sources to engage anonymously in First Amend-
ment activities was argued in Branzburg,3' the right was analyzed in-
correctly. The journalists simply suggested that the source's interest was
much like that of the reporter and thus added more weight to the in-
terest in nondisclosure.32 The Court, moreover, did not carefully
analyze the source's interest;3 3 Justice White simply noted that the
privilege claimed was for the reporter, not the source,34 and that an
informer has no constitutional protection if the judiciary decides that
28. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
29. Id.
30. Although Justice White did not use the word "balancing," he noted that laws
serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the press because the First
Amendment does not bar incidental burdens. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). Justice Powell,
whose vote was necessary for a majority, stressed in his concurring opinion that reporters'
claims for a privilege should be balanced on a case-by-case basis against the obligation of
all citizens to testify about criminal conduct. Id. at 710; cf. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Branzburg decision hinged on assess-
ment of competing interests). Lower courts generally have interpreted Branzburg to
require a balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Baker v. F&F Inv., 470
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (civil litigant in class action
denied disclosure of reporter's sources); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 617-19, 266
N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (1978) (criminal defendant not entitled to disclosure of reporter's
sources). But see, e.g., Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 294, 562 P.2d
791, 797, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) (no reporter's privilege founded on First Amend-
ment exists in absolute or qualified version); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364
Mass. 317, 320, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1973) (First Amendment provides no privilege,
qualified or absolute).
31. See note 8 supra.
32. Petitioner Branzburg, for example, asserted that "[t]he state action in the instant
cases destroys the effective exercise of First Amendment rights." Brief for Petitioner
Branzburg, supra note 8, at 14. He then detailed the asserted burdens of disclosure on
newsgathering, reportorial independence, and the rights of sources. The argument based
on source's rights is the last and shortest of the three. Id. at 14-27.
33. This failure might be explained by the fact that the grand .juries in Branzburg
sought testimony from the reporters about alleged criminal activity that they had wit-
nessed personally and thus the Court was not confronted with a case in which a reporter
was called upon to testify about information received exclusively from sources. Cf. In re
Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978) (reporter began in-
vestigation 10 years after incidents occurred, therefore dependent on sources).
34. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972).
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his identity should be revealed.3 5 The interests of the source should
not be dismissed so casually. If the Branzburg Court had considered the
true nature of sources' interests, and the effect that disclosure would
have upon these interests, the test in Branzburg would have been drawn
much differently.
II. A Source's Right to Confidentiality
A. The Right to Anonymous Speech and Association
Reporters' sources are protected by two related First Amendment
rights-a right to anonymous speech and a right to engage in confi-
dential association. The right to speak anonymously was recognized in
Talley v. California,3 6 where the Court struck down a Los Angeles city
ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to distribute any handbill that
did not have the author's name printed on it. 3 7 The city defended the
ordinance as an attempt to ensure that individuals engaged in fraud,
false advertising, or libel could be identified.38
The Supreme Court, however, said that the identification require-
ment tended to restrict the freedom to distribute information and
35. Id. at 698. Although the Court did not address itself to the interests of the source,
it did express two concerns that might make it reluctant to protect such interests. First,
the Court said that the crime of misprision, 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976), which requires each
citizen to raise a "hue and cry" over wrongdoing, might require disclosure of confidential
sources, 408 U.S. at 696-97. The fear of condoning misprision, however, should not bar
permitting a reporter to protect his source. Misprision requires both knowledge of a
crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation. Id. at 696 n.36. These
requirements are not met by the actions of the confidential source. By revealing informa-
tion to a reporter, the source does not conceal the alleged wrongdoing, but in fact makes
disclosure, and prosecution, more likely.
Second, the Court expressed reluctance to foster "a private system of informers." Id. at
697. The Court distinguished police informers from press informers by noting that the
decision to unmask the former is in public hands and can be compelled by the judiciary.
Id. at 698. The recently enacted Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 47
U.S.L.W. 45 (Nov. 28, 1978), eliminates the importance of this distinction, however, be-
cause the Act places authority to keep the identity of government whistleblowers con-
fidential in the hands of a Special Counsel, not the judiciary, id. § 1206(b)(1)(B). The
Special Counsel is a new position created by the Act. Although the Special Counsel is a
public official, he is free from any control by a court. Thus the informers that the press
might utilize are not significantly different from the "private system of informers" now
protected under the Civil Service Reform Act.
36. 862 U.S. 60 (1960).
37. Id. at 60-61. The ordinance in Talley prohibited any anonymous handbill dis-
tributed in any place under any circumstances, and thus was void on overbreadth grounds.
Id. at 63-65. Although the Court did not rule on the validity of a more limited ordi-
nance, id. at 64, it did say that anonymity has been used "for the most constructive
purposes," id. at 65, thus indicating that the Court's protection of confidential com-
munication probably would extend at least to political expression and discussions of
public matters.
38. Id. at 64.
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thereby freedom of expression.3 9 Because fear of identification and
reprisal could lead to self-censorship, such an ordinance was a direct
restraint on expression and chilled citizens' First Amendment activity.40
When the source is functioning as a "whistleblower," alerting the
public to possible wrongdoing, the source's claim for protection in
disseminating information is particularly strong. Talley noted that
anonymous speech has played an important role in the nation's political
history,4 1 and First Amendment protection is traditionally great when
speech is directed at the operation of government. 42
In a series of decisions during the late 1950s and early 1960s the
Court recognized that the Constitution protects citizens' right to join
in confidential associations.43 Thus the Court has rebuffed attempts to
force groups to disclose their membership, 44 or to force individuals to
identify the groups to which they belong.45 It has recognized that the
right to assemble to advance ideas is fundamental to democratic
government. 46 Therefore, the Court has protected individuals from
compelled disclosure of group membership that could subject them to
harassment and reprisals.47
39. Id.
40. Id. at 64-65 (ordinance may deter peaceful discussions of public matters of im-
portance).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (major purpose of First Amend-
ment is free discussion of governmental affairs); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269, 279-80 (1964) (First Amendment protects defamation of public officials absent
.,actual malice").
Congress has recently expanded protection of anonymous speech by explicitly guarantee-
ing government whistleblowers a right to anonymity under the new Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 1206(b)(1)(B), 47 U.S.L.W. 45, 49 (Nov. 28, 1978). The
statute constitutes an affirmative statement of public policy that anonymity should be
extended when necessary to encourage disclosure of possible wrongdoing.
43. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). The Court recognized in each case that members were exercising First Amend-
ment rights through participation in the group. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958). The Court has
not always upheld a right to confidential association, but the cases compelling dis-
closure generally involved allegations of membership in the Communist Party. See, e.g.,
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959). In these cases the Court has placed great weight on the fact that Congress
specifically authorized inquiries into the Communist Party and that the Party repre-
sented a direct threat to national security. See, e.g., 366 U.S. at 52 (Communist Party
membership not unrelated to danger of illegal activity); 360 U.S. at 128 (close nexus
between Communist Party and violent overthrow of government).
44. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
45. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960); cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957) (individual protected from disclosing information about others'
membership).
46. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) (free speech, free press, and
right to assemble at foundation of government based on consent).
47. E.g., id. at 523-24.
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B. The Source's Rights Under Branzburg
The Court's recognition of a right to engage anonymously in First
Amendment activity applies directly to a reporter's confidential sources
and undermines the legitimacy of the approach employed in Branzbiurg.
The source's interests are pure First Amendment interests, not simply
instrumental interests, and cannot be balanced away as was the First
Amendment interest in newsgathering in Branzburg.
Grand jury subpoenas are a direct restraint on sources' expression
and substantially chill that protected activity. A source who com-
municates his message to the public through a reporter is engaged in
pure First Amendment expression.48 In Branzburg the Court mini-
mized the press's interest by deciding that only the instrumental in-
terest in newsgathering was affected, and thus any burden was only an
indirect restraint on First Amendment activity. What the Court failed
to consider was the source's pure First Amendment interest, which
merits a higher degree of protection than does newsgathering.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that such a pure First Amend-
ment interest will be protected from a direct restraint or a restraint
that will have a substantial chilling effect.49 Talley ° and the associa-
tion cases5l recognize that forcing anonymous speakers to reveal their
identities imposes a direct restraint on their First Amendment activity.
The Court's special concern with preventing such direct restraints is
evidenced by the nearly absolute protection given the press against
government attempts to determine either what cannot be communi-
cated (prior restraints) 52 or what must be communicated (mandatory
access). 53 Compelling reporters to reveal their confidential sources
48. There are at least two reasons why a source might prefer to disseminate his mes-
sage through a willing reporter-a lack of other means to disseminate the information and
a preference for the broader platform of an established news outlet. See note 54 infra.
That a reporter makes the communication more effective in no way alters the basic
nature of the communication or the degree of First Amendment protection that it merits.
49. E.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) ("[Tlhe First Amendment
needs breathing space [and] statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judg-
ment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of
society."); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (constitutional violations may arise even
from chilling effect of regulations).
50. 362 U.S. at 65.
51. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960).
52. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (barriers to prior
restraint remain high); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(government carries heavy burden in showing justification for imposing prior restraint).
53. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating state
law requiring newspaper to publish reply to editorial); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters not required to accept paid
editorial advertisements); see Abrams, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 361, 367 (1976) (First
Amendment protection greatest against prior restraints and mandatory access).
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restrains a source's expression in both ways: the source cannot dis-
seminate the information unless he disseminates his identity as well."
Even if compelling disclosure of a reporter's source is not charac-
terized as a direct restraint on the source's expression, disclosure will
result in a chilling effect on the source. This chilling effect will be
neither insubstantial nor speculative in the way the Court in Branzburg
viewed the impact of disclosure on newsgathering. That such disclosure
can chill expression was settled by Talley,55 in which the Court in-
validated an identification ordinance because it would lead to self-
censorship.56
The cases upholding a right to confidential association squarely ad-
dressed the chilling effect of disclosure on association. 5 Sources of the
press engage in protected confidential association in two ways. First, the
source's contact with a reporter merits protection. When anonymity is
necessary in order for the contact to occur,5s and when the association
results in the dissemination of ideas or information, the source-reporter
relationship comes directly within the ambit of the cases recognizing a
right to confidential association.59 Second, the source may himself be
54. A source who does not wish to be identified through a subpoena to a reporter
can, of course, forego mass-media communication for self-publication of the kind pro-
tected in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). But this alternative forces the source to
trade effective communication for anonymity. See D. LANE, R. BAER & S. BALL, MASS
MEDIA AND VIOLENcE 68 (1969) ("Today, unless the individual has access to formal channels
of communication, it is almost impossible for him to have an impact.") Anonymous
pamphleteering, although certainly protected by the First Amendment, is in no way an
adequate substitute for dissemination of a message through a willing news outlet. One
commentator suggests that if the source wishes to remain anonymous but still com-
municate through mass media, he may either purchase advertising space or be guar-
anteed a right to print a "letter-to-the-editor." Constitutional Protection, supra note 7,
at 128. The former, however, conditions First Amendment activity on the availability of
money, while the latter is a direct intrusion on the functions of the editor. Cf. Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating state right-of-reply
statute as violative of First Amendment); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Natel Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters not required to accept paid editorial ad-
vertisements). Neither alternative, therefore, is adequate.
55. 362 U.S. at 64 ("no doubt" that identification requirement tends to limit freedom
of expression).
56. The sensitivity of a source and the gulf between his view of the press and of
government are suggested by the court of appeals in Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Black Panthers were willing to
talk at length with reporter Caldwell, id. at 1084, yet the court found that his relation-
ship with the Black Panthers would be jeopardized if he even appeared before a grand
jury, id. at 1088-89.
57. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (compelled disclosure may
constitute effective restraint on association).
58. See note 18 supra.
59. The potential importance of the right to association was recognized by both Justice
Douglas and Justice Stewart in their Branzburg dissents. Although neither Justice relied
heavily on-this interest, both noted that a reporter and source might have an interest in
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a member of a group that merits associational protection. 0 If dis-
closure of the source threatens disclosure of the group or of the gToup's
activities, then forcing a reporter to identify his source violates the
First Amendment rights of the source and his group.0 1
Congress recently acknowledged the chilling effect of compelled
disclosure on expression by guaranteeing government whistleblowers
anonymity so that they might reveal possible wrongdoing without fear
of reprisals. 2 The chill imposed by disclosure on the source's expression
is clearly direct and certain, in contrast to the speculative chill on news-
gathering identified in Branzburg.
The effect of disclosure on sources is demonstrated by In re Farber.3
In that case, confidential sources had served as whistleblowers and dis-
seminated information through the news stories of reporter Farber.
Their activity was, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. Many
of Farber's sources were known to the criminal defendant and could
have been summoned directly to testify. 64 Others, perhaps, were known
only to Farber. To the extent that these sources would not disseminate
information except under a pledge of confidentiality, compelling
Farber to reveal his sources would directly restrain their First Amend-
ment activity. In effect, the sources were ordered to reveal their identi-
ties as a condition for engaging in expression. Such a restraint sub-
stantially chills any future expression by these sources and by others
who might similarly disseminate information only under a guarantee
of confidentiality.
Thus, when the First Amendment interests of sources are properly
considered, cases involving a claim of reporter's privilege present a very
different calculus of interests than the Court perceived in Branzburg.
association that deserves protection. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (reporter's privacy of association also at stake); id. at 726 n.2
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (associational right of reporter and source included under First
Amendment).
60. In Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
for instance, a grand jury sought information about Black Panther meetings at which the
participants were engaged in speech and assembly that merited First Amendment pro-
tection. Cf. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-24 (1960) (freedom of con-
fidential association upheld for group "airing grievances" and "advancing ideas"); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (confidential association to engage in advocacy
upheld).
61. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("It is
particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be carefully
circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive
areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of
communication of ideas .... ") The majority opinion in Branzburg does not cite Sweezy.
62. See note 42 suPtra.
63. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. CL 598 (1978).
64. Id. at 279-80, 394 A.2d at 340-41 (listing some of Farber's sources).
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From the perspective of sources, the cases do, to paraphrase the Court,
involve intrusions on speech and assembly, prior restraints, and restric-
tions on what the source may publish.65 The cases do, in effect, sanc-
tion an express or implied command that the source publish what he
prefers to withhold. The existence of this direct restraint and substan-
tial chill on the source's First Amendment activity renders the balanc-
ing approach implicit in Branzburg illegitimate. Instead, the Court
must employ the "compelling state interest" approach it has adopted
for cases involving direct intrusions on First Amendment interests;G6
first the Court must determine whether the government has a com-
pelling interest in the confidential information, and second, even if a
compelling interest is demonstrated, the Court must determine whether
there exists a less restrictive means for satisfying that interest.,-
III. Adjudicating Sources' Rights
In determining whether there is a compelling state interest that
might warrant disclosure of a confidential source, the Court must
examine both the party asserting the need for information and the
facts of the particular situation. The need for disclosure may be as-
65. See p. 1206 supra.
66. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (significant encroach-
ment on personal liberty justified only by compelling state interest); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (subordinating interest of state must be compelling).
67. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.")
In Branzburg, Justice White asserted that the cases before the Court met any require-
ment that the government show a compelling interest in the information. 408 U.S. at
700-01. His explanation, however, is unconvincing. Justice White stated that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest in law enforcement. Id. This assertion ignores the fact that
the government had shown no compelling need for the specific information the reporters
possessed, as distinguished from information about the subject in general. In any event,
Justice White ignored any need to explore less restrictive means for satisfying the govern-
ment interest in forcing the reporters to disclose their sources.
Justice Stewart, dissenting in Branzburg, contended that courts should only compel a
reporter to disclose his confidential sources when (I) the government had shown there
was probable cause to believe the reporter had information relevant to a specific viola-
tion; (2) the government had shown there were no alternative sources for the informa-
tion; and (3) there was a compelling state interest in receiving the information. Id. at 743.
Justice Stewart based his justification for such a stringent test on the view that news-
gathering was a direct First Amendment right. Id. at 727-28. It is not necessary to accord
full First Amendment protection to newsgathering, however, in order to justify a com-
pelling state interest analysis. The interests of the source compel this approach. Further-
more, Justice Stewarts proposed test fails to consider means of protecting the source even
when no alternative sources are available. See pp. 1216-17 infra.
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serted by any of several groups-a g-rand jury, 8 a criminal prosecutor,09
a criminal defendant,70 a civil litigant,7 a legislative committee,72 or an
administrative agency.73 The weight to be accorded a demand for in-
formation will vary depending on the nature of the party seeking
access; 74 the state interest in resolving alleged criminal activity, for in-
stance, is thought to be gTeater than the interest of civil litigants in
resolving a dispute.7 5 Moreover, the need for information will vary
depending upon the circumstances of each case. When the information
is duplicative" or only tangential77 to a claim or inquiry, the need for
disclosure will be much less than when the information is critical to
resolve the conflict.78
68. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (grand juries seek information from
three reporters).
69. E.g., In re McGowan, 303 A.2d 645, 648 (Del. 1973) (Attorney General may be
authorized to subpoena reporter).
70. E.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978);
Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978) (criminal defendant denied re-
porter's testimony).
71. E.g., Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973) (reporter's testimony sought in civil suit).
72. E.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (right to subpoena witnesses
before legislative committee is essential and appropriate auxiliary to legislative function).
73. The right of administrative agencies to subpoena witnesses is secured by statute.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (FTC); 42 U.S.C. § 1975d(f) (1976) (Commission on Civil Rights).
74. V. BLASI, supra note 7, at 146-95 (analyzing weights to be accorded interest in dis-
closure asserted by various kinds of parties).
75. See Murasky, supra note 3, at 899. Even when the need for information is asserted
in a criminal prosecution, however, the court might determine that the state interest is
not sufficiently significant to warrant the resulting intrusion on the First Amendment
interests of the source. Courts must decide which prosecutions are important enough to
warrant the burden on First Amendment freedoms.
76. See note 78 infra.
77. E.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 966 (1974) (criminal defendant denied right to subpoena reporter because in-
formation not central to defense).
78. E.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)
(reporter's assertion of privilege denied because information sought central to plaintiff's
claim).
The potential impact of properly recognizing a source's rights is demonstrated by
Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Andrews, a re-
porter, received information from a source, named C, about purported official impro-
prieties on the expressed condition that the source's identity be kept confidential. When
Andrews moved to quash a grand jury subpoena, the court, citing Branzburg, ruled there
was no privilege available. Id. at 415, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 446. The source, however, was
disseminating information and providing a public service in exposing possible wrongdoing.
The grand jury had available to it alternative sources of information. Id. at 421-24, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 449-51 (two sources not protected by court, thus available to grand jury; re-
porter asserts other sources also available). The direct intrusion on the interests of the
source, therefore, was unwarranted. Andrews ultimately was permitted to protect C under
a state shield law.
In a similar case, State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.
3545 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1979), the reporter was ordered to serve 60 days in jail on criminal
contempt charges after refusing to disclose his source, id. at 814. The reporter disclosed
confidential information to a criminal prosecutor and to the defense counsel, but refused
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Even when a compelling state interest is shown, a court still must
seek a less restrictive means for satisfying that interest before ordering
disclosure of a source. In particular, a court should require a showing
that there is a complete absence of alternative sources and that the
source's evidence is essential to resolve the conflict.70 Unless the party
seeking disclosure can make such a showing, a court should not force
disclosure.8 0
When it is held that the interests of the reporter and source are in-
sufficient to prevent all disclosures by the reporter, consideration of
the interests of the confidential source should still influence judicial
decisions at a second stage: when testimony by the reporter is com-
pelled, the inquiry should be sharply circumscribed to limit the degree
of intrusion on the interests of the source. In particular, a court
to reveal his source. The state supreme court acknowledged that there was a limited
privilege available to reporters, but upheld the lower court's decision against the reporter.
Id. at 814, 816. By failing to acknowledge and protect the source's interest, the court
forced the reporter to bear the burden of maintaining the source's anonymity.
79. These criteria follow from the Court's prior use of a "compelling state interest"
test. They are also implicit in the recently enacted Civil Service Reform Act's protection
of government whistleblowers. See note 42 supra; SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS, CONFERENCE REPORT FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORMf Aar OF 1978, S. REP. No. 1272,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1978) (rule is nondisclosure and confidentiality may be breached
only so major investigation not halted solely to avoid identifying source; if source is
disclosed, Special Counsel must ensure source suffers no reprisals).
80. In some cases, a reporter might be willing to disclose a source although the source
would prefer confidentiality. In such cases the reporter would simply offer the informa-
tion upon request, respond to the subpoena, or publish the information as news. Should a
source attempt to restrain disclosure, the effort would doubtless fail-and properly so-as
an impermissible prior restraint. The source's interest, though significant, would not be
great enough to overcome the strong presumption against prior restraints. See note 52
supra.
In the event the reporter desired to protect the source's identity but the source desired
to come forward, the source could easily do so. Indeed, the source's willingness to appear
has caused courts to deny reporters' claims of privilege under state shield laws. People v.
Zagarino, 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 1978); Andrews v. Andreoli,
92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977). When the source is willing to be ex-
posed, the reporter suffers no injury in disclosing his identity. Thus courts will confront
serious conflicts over protection of confidential sources only when both the reporter and
the source oppose disclosure.
It may be difficult, of course, for the source to be represented in court or play a formal
role in the proceedings. Representation should not be required, however, for the court to
take cognizance of the source's interests. Most importantly, the reporter can assert the
source's interests along with his own; they seek the same result although the magnitude
of tile interests may vary. The reporter is an appropriate representative of the source.
See 82 HARv. L. REV. 1384, 1389 (1969). To require the source to be represented separately
would pose insuperable problems. In coming forward to protect his anonymity, the source
would have to identify himself. If represented through counsel, the court would have to
ascertain that the counsel actually spoke for the source. These difficulties are insignificant
if the reporter is permitted to assert the source's rights along with his own. Similar con-
siderations led the Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), to permit the
organization to assert the rights of its members to anonymity since "[to require that it
be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the
very moment of its assertion," id. at 459.
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should (1) attempt in camera review of the reporter's information to
determine whether exposure of the source's information is actually
necessary,8' and (2) consider means of protecting the identity of the
source even if the content of the source's information is revealed s2
In some instances in camera review may be all that is required.83
Indeed, such review has sometimes been sufficient to resolve cases in-
volving conflicts only over the interests of the reporter.8 4 If in camera
review is not sufficient and the court deems that some disclosure is
81. Even though the government may make a prima facie showing of need sufficient
to overcome the rights of the reporter and source, in camera review may disclose that the
testimony should not be revealed publicly because either (1) its value to the government
or other party seeking disclosure would actually be so small that the harm to the source
and the reporter outweighs the benefits, or (2) the impairment of the interests of the
reporter and source caused by disclosure would be greater than originally believed, thus
tipping the balance.
There is, of course, a difficulty inherent in all in camera review: when the material is
never disclosed, later courts do not have clear guidance as to why disclosure was not
compelled or how the material then before the court compares with the information
previously granted confidentiality. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
732 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (decision withholding disclosure would provide little
guidance). This concern, though valid, should not be permitted to deter courts from
making use of in camera review. When a decision to grant anonymity rests on the fact
that in camera review demonstrated that the information merely duplicates other in-
formation already in the record, or simply supports such information, there would be
no need to disclose the confidential material to aid a future court.
82. The utility of in camera review for consideration of conflicting claims on con-
fidential material has been recognized in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976). The Act was amended in 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § l(b)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 1562 (1974)
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970)), to make clear that courts are permitted to engage in
in camera review of classified documents when litigants seek material that the govern-
ment contends is within one of the Act's exceptions. Although recognizing that in camera
review might not always be required, the conference committee stated that in many
situations it would be both necessary and appropriate. S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6285, 6287-88. The report
states that the government shall be given an opportunity to establish that the documents
are exempt. Only if this effort fails would the court employ in camera review. Id. When
a court is considering a reporter's confidential sources the court should follow a similar
procedure by considering the interests of the source and the journalist to determine
whether complete nondisclosure is appropriate before authorizing in camera review.
83. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 572 P.2d 1258
(1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (trial court ordered to hold in camera proceeding
to determine reliability of reporters' sources and accuracy of their information, and
whether to require full disclosure of sources' identities). In camera review could be
particularly useful for protecting confidential sources in cases such as Ammerman in-
volving charges of libel-an extraordinarily thorny area for traditional analysis of re-
porter's privilege because it focuses on the actions of the reporter; it is often necessary to
know about his sources in order to determine liability. A reporter might eliminate the
possibility of "actual malice"-and hence liability in a libel action by a public figure-by
presenting clear and convincing evidence that seemingly reliable information was received
from an identifiable source. Identification of this source in camera could satisfy the court
and still protect the source's confidentiality. Although revealing this information to a
judge even in camera could be considered disclosure, it is certainly less disclosure-and
less likely to result in repercussions for the source-than disclosure in open court.
84. See, e.g., State v. Stoney, No. 74-227 (Crim. Div., lth Cir. Ct., Fla. 1974).
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necessary, in camera procedures may still be used to consider means to
protect the identity of the source even though the content of his in-
formation is disclosed.8 5 In particular, it may be possible for the re-
porter to provide the requested information but simply delete the
name of the source.8 6 When this is sufficient to meet the needs of the
court, the procedure could be a suitable compromise between the
source's interests and the need for information. Disclosure of a source
in open court would be appropriate only in that small number of cases
when a compelling state interest had been shown and no less restrictive
means of satisfying that interest could be devised.
Conclusion
In the area of reporter's privilege, courts have been forced to balance
opposing-and weighty-claims of right. Both the interest in disclosure
and the press's interest in protecting confidential sources are strong.
Clashes over reporter's privilege, however, also involve a third interest
that courts have failed to consider adequately: the interest of the
source. The source's interest, rooted squarely in the First Amendment,
is qualitatively different from that of the reporter and under the
Court's own constitutional methodology deserves explicit considera-
tion and a high degree of protection. Only by carefully considering the
source's interest, an interest in pure First Amendment activity, can
courts properly protect all the interests implicated in a case involving
a claim of reporter's privilege.
85. In the case of material that is published, the contents will already be available to
the court. Often, however, cases involving confidential sources involve material that either
was omitted from the published story or was never developed into a story. In such cases
the reporter may seek to protect both the identity of the source and the contents of the
information.
86. The government was ordered to follow this procedure in Department of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (in camera procedures ordered to delete names, followed by
disclosure, as compromise between individual rights and public's right to government in-
formation).
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